Russian production fell by 170,000 b/d from April to May, as the disruption to oil exports caused output to fall to 60,000 b/d less than the OPEC+ commitment. The last hurdle is restoring 750,000 b/d via the northern leg of Druzhba. Due to spare export capacity, however, Russian production will recover in June after falling to 11.1 million b/d in May.
This month, members of the OPEC+ deal will produce nearly 43.3 million b/d, roughly 1.3 million b/d less than in October 2018, the baseline production month for the current deal, and in compliance with the deal’s pledged cuts of 1.2 million b/d. May marks the third consecutive month of overcompliance. While Saudi production drove compliance earlier, falling Russian production due to the temporary closure of the Druzhba pipeline has contributed to compliance in April and May.
This year, Middle Eastern demand for transport fuels is on track to rise by 50,000 b/d to an average of nearly 4.2 million b/d, following two consecutive years of contraction. This turnaround will be driven by Saudi Arabia, where a return to gasoline demand growth and flat diesel consumption following substantial declines last year will help boost regional demand.
In 2019, North Sea crude and condensate output will fall for the third consecutive year, by roughly 70,000 b/d to an average of 2.5 million b/d as declines in Norway continue to outpace gains in the U.K. However, in 2020, North Sea output will rise by 200,000 b/d to more than 2.7 million b/d due primarily to the ramp-up of production at the Johan Sverdrup project.
As IMO specification changes approach quickly, ESAI Energy takes another look fuel oil upgrading projects through 2020. Current investments are not enough to eliminate a large surplus of heavy fuel oil components by 2020. Identifying fuel oil upgrading investments by type is critical to understanding the quality and quantity of fuel oil that will be both consumed in bunker markets and in surplus.
Four weeks after the contamination of Russian oil disrupted the flow of 1.3 million b/d of crude to Belarus and via the Druzhba pipeline to Europe, it appears Russia is fully restoring those pipeline deliveries. To compensate for the loss of as much as 1 million b/d of overland crude deliveries, Russia managed only a small net increase in seaborne exports. This disruption to production, exports and revenues may have strengthened Russian resistance to an extension of the OPEC+ deal.
Crude may be at a six-month high this month, but feedstock prices are falling like dominoes. As naphtha lost ground on crude, Far East spot propane and butane prices traded at wider discounts to naphtha. Back at Mt Belvieu, a temporary de-linking of propane and butane from the international market caused those prices to fall even more than international benchmarks. For some product markets, the 12-month outlook is anything but “more of the same.” Among other things, new LPG export terminals and higher demand growth will be supportive of U.S. LPG exports and Mt Belvieu pricing.
After rising by 1.2 million and 660,000 b/d in 2017 and 2018, respectively, global demand for transport fuels will rise by just 440,000 b/d this year due to an outright decline in Chinese consumption, further deceleration in European demand growth, as well as a slowdown in U.S. and Indian demand growth.
Yesterday, the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) of OPEC met to assess the oil market and the impact of the OPEC+ production restraint. The committee commended the “agile and flexible approach” of the OPEC+ countries, but made no specific recommendations beyond continuing to monitor the oil market until the next meeting in June. That JMMC meeting will take place just before the full Ministerial meeting at which the member states will decide whether to continue the current production restraint. The JMMC communique pointed out “critical uncertainties” such as trade negotiations, monetary policy and geopolitical challenges. Among those geopolitical challenges are rising tensions between Iran and the U.S. since the non-renewal of sanctions waivers early this month. The possibility that the two countries could stumble into direct military conflict is rising.
Brazil’s crude production will reach 3.0 million b/d by the end of 2019, with output surging in April and beyond as maintenance subsides and offshore units deployed in 2018 continue to ramp up. Brazil’s exportable surplus will rise by 300,000 b/d in the second half of 2019, even as the region’s surplus shrinks on Mexico and Venezuela’s declines.
Anticipating more restrictive drilling regulations in Colorado, production of crude and condensate from the Niobrara surged in the second half of 2018, raising annual output by 145,000 b/d. Production will grow by another 125,000 b/d in 2019 then slow down to an increase of 85,000 b/d in 2020 as well completions return to a less rapid pace.
After growing by an annual average of 60,000 b/d over the last five years, European jet fuel demand is expected to rise by a similar amount this year, as the region’s air traffic continues to grow steadily. However, jet fuel will represent the lone bright spot in the broader European transport fuel market, as non-jet fuel consumption growth slows to 40,000 b/d this year from 100,000 and 195,000 b/d in 2018 and 2017, respectively.
Regional gasoline demand is set to decrease for the third year in a row in 2019. Eating into fuel demand are once again Venezuela’s economic collapse and, to a lesser extent, Brazil’s hydrous ethanol. The rest of the region will not see gasoline demand rise either. Latin America gasoline demand will fall by 100,000 b/d, from 2.5 million b/d in 2018 to 2.4 million b/d for 2019 and 2020.
We expect record-high crude imports of 10.6 million b/d in April to be a one-off event due to stocking before the end of the Iranian oil waivers. In the next two months, crude imports could fall below 10 million b/d given more capacity loss during maintenance, as ESAI Energy’s refinery-level research shows. Meanwhile, Beijing’s second batch of quotas suggest exports could be as high as 390,000 b/d for gasoline, 600,000 b/d for diesel, and 590,000 b/d for jet between now and October.
As the U.S. deploys military assets to the Arab Gulf region, and continues to increase the pressure on Iran, will Iran retaliate? Closing the Straits of Hormuz is what first comes to mind, but that step would not really help Iran beyond showing its resistance to the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf. Moreover, it can be overcome by a U.S. military response. Cyber-attacks on its neighbors, especially their oil facilities, would be more subtle and deniable. As Iran’s economy deteriorates, the likelihood of some form of retaliation is growing.